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BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE UNITED
STATES PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE: THE JOURNAL OF SCIENCE
AND TECHNOLOGY LAW
SYMPOSIUM
PRIVILEGE FOR PATENT AGENTS
MEGAN M. LA BELLEt
INTRODUCTION
Patent agents, in many ways, are unique operators in our legal system. They
are not attorneys; yet, they are authorized by Congress to practice law before
the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).' This unusual status
raises a host of questions, including whether communications with patent
agents should be privileged and, therefore, shielded from discovery.2 This
question has become increasingly important in recent years with the rise of lit-
igation at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB}-an administrative tribu-
nal created in 2011 by the America Invents Act (AIA}-where parties can be
represented either by a patent attorney or a patent agent.3
Patent agents have xisted in the United States for almost as long as the pa-
f Associate Professor, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law. This Ar-
ticle was prepared for the Journal's symposium "Bridging the Gap between the Federal
Courts and the United States Patent & Trademark Office." The author would like to thank
the editors for organizing the symposium, and the participants-particularly Rochelle Drey-
fuss, Paul Gugliuzza, Dmitry Karshtedt, Arti Rai, Greg Reilly, and Melissa Wasserman-for
their extremely helpful comments and suggestions. Monika Ledlova also deserves special
thanks for her excellent research assistance.
i Sperry v. State of Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 384-85 (1963).
2 See, e.g., David Hricik, Patent Agents: The Person You Are, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
261, 263-64 (2007).
3 37 C.F.R. § 11.5 (2016).
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tent system itself, so the question of how to treat patent agent communications
is not new.4 To be sure, lower courts grappled with the question for close to
seventy years, but still could not reach consensus.5 In 2016, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit took up the issue in In re Queen 's
University at Kingston and created a new privilege protecting patent agent
communications.6 While the court made clear that the new privilege is limited
in scope, the exact boundaries remain undefined.7
The PTO, too, has been navigating this patent agent privilege terrain. Be-
fore Queen's University, the agency was meeting with stakeholders and col-
lecting comments about how to address various privilege issues that arise be-
fore the PTO, particularly with respect to PTAB proceedings.8 Once the
Federal Circuit weighed in, it would have been perfectly reasonable for the
PTO to take a wait-and-see approach. But that's not what happened. Instead,
less than six months after Queen's University, the PTO forged ahead proposing
its own rule on patent agent privilege that differs from the Federal Circuit's
rule in potentially significant ways.9
This effort to recognize a patent agent privilege is laudable. Although the
sharing of information and "search for truth" are fundamental principles of our
justice system,10 protecting communications between patent agents and clients
ultimately inures to the public. Not only does it encourage frank conversations
and legal advice similar to the attorney-client privilege, it also encourages in-
novation by making patent protection more accessible because patent agent
fees are usually lower than lawyer fees.II In order to be effective, however, the
patent agent privilege cannot be uncertain.12
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides back-
ground on the law of privilege in federal court. Part II explains the unique role
patent agents play in our legal system, and how they've been treated to date.
Part III then turns to recent developments regarding patent agents and privi-
lege, including the Federal Circuit's decision in Queen's University and the
PTO's proposed rule for patent agent privilege. Part IV concludes by high-
4 See infra Part II.
See id.
6 In re Queen's Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Id. at 1301-02.
8 See infra Part III.B.
9 See infra Part IV.
10 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974).
" See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Federal Circuit Patent Agent Privilege Rule to Lower Legal
Costs, LAw360 (Mar. 9, 2016, 11:10 PM), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/768772/fed-
circ-patent-agent-privilege-rule-to-lower-legal-costs ("Including patent attorneys on com-
munications with patent agents just to preserve attorney-client privilege drives up the cost of
preparing and prosecuting patent applications.") [https://perma.cc/2MQ3-FR4L].
12 Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 393 (1981) ("An uncertain privilege ... is lit-
tle better than no privilege at all.").
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lighting some of the inconsistencies between these rules and potential issues
that may consequently arise, so we can begin to consider the best path forward.
I. PRIVILEGE IN FEDERAL COURT
Communications between attorneys and clients are privileged, meaning they
cannot be disclosed during discovery, trial, or a government investigation
without permission of the client.13 The purpose of this privilege is to encour-
age frank discussion between clients and attorneys, which results in effective
and efficient representation.14 In other words, the attorney-client privilege
"promote[s] broader public interests in the observance of law and administra-
tion of justice [by] recogniz[ing] that sound legal advice .... depends upon the
lawyer being fully informed by the client." 5
Although the attorney-client privilege has existed for centuries, questions
about its application continue to arise.16 Courts have struggled over the years
to decide who is a "client" and who is an "attorney" for purposes of the privi-
lege.17 Whether the privilege should protect communications with non-
attorney professionals is another issue that courts have frequently faced, often
reaching different results. Communications with legal assistants and parale-
gals, for instance, tend to be protected as long as they are performing ministe-
rial tasks and assisting the attorney in rendering legal advice.'8
Courts have been far less consistent with respect to communications be-
tween clients and other non-lawyer professionals, however. Questions about
whether a client's communications with accountants, public relations consult-
ants, and-most importantly for this Article-patent agents fall within the am-
bit of attorney-client privilege have divided courts. Some courts have held that
such communications are privileged because they facilitate "effective consulta-
tion between the client and the lawyer."'9 Others have refused to extend the
privilege unless the non-lawyer was acting as a "translator or interpreter" of
client communications.20 Still others have determined that, in some circum-
1 Id. at 3 89.
14 Id.
15 Id.
6 See id. (noting that the attorney-client privilege is "the oldest of the privileges for con-
fidential communications known to the common law").
17 See id. at 389-90 (announcing a new test for determining who the client is when the
party is a corporation); see also U.S. Postal Serv. v. Phelps Dodge Refining Corp., 852 F.
Supp. 156, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1994) (holding that in-house counsel is not an "attorney" for
privilege purposes when operating in a business, rather than legal, capacity).
'8 United States v. Kovel, 296 F.2d 918, 921 (2d Cir. 1961) ("[T]he government does
not here dispute that the privilege covers communications to non-lawyer employees with a
menial or ministerial responsibility that involves relating communications to an attorney.")
(internal quotations omitted).
Id. at 922.
20 United States v. Ackert, 169 F.3d 136, 139 (2d Cir. 1999).
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stances when the attomey-client privilege does not apply, a new privilege
should be created to protect communications with non-lawyers.21
When federal courts grapple with matters of privilege, the first question to
resolve is whose law should apply. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 says that
"[t]he common law-as interpreted by United States courts in the light of rea-
son and experience-governs a claim of privilege unless" the U.S. Constitu-
tion, a federal statute, or Supreme Court rules provide otherwise.22 Rule 501
further states, however, that "in a civil case, state law governs privilege regard-
ing a claim or defense for which state law supplies the rule of decision."23
This means that federal common law applies to privilege issues in civil matters
based on federal law, while state law applies when the underlying civil claim is
based on state law.24 Because patent suits involve questions of federal law,
any privilege issues that arise will be controlled by federal common law.25
What is more, the Supreme Court has made clear that, under Rule 501, fed-
eral courts have the power to define or create new privileges by interpreting
common law principles.26 In the Court's words, Rule 501 "did not freeze the
law governing the privileges of witnesses in federal trials at a particular point
in our history, but rather directed federal courts to 'continue the evolutionary
development of testimonial privileges. "'27 Still, courts must be circumspect in
creating new privileges because the idea that parties should openly exchange
information is a cornerstone of the American justice system.28 Thus, a new
privilege-such as the patent agent privilege-should be recognized only if the
public benefit of protecting the information outweighs the "predominant prin-
ciple of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining truth." 29
II. PATENT AGENTS
There are a number of features that set patent practice apart from other areas
of the law, and patent agents are one of them. Patent agents are technically-
trained non-lawyers whose primary task is prosecuting patents, meaning they
21 See In re Queen's Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1294 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (recogniz-
ing patent agent privilege); see also Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996) (holding that
FRE 501 authorizes federal courts to define new privileges).
22 FED. R. EvrD. 501.
23 Id.
24 See Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule ofEvidence 501: Privilege and
Vertical Choice ofLaw, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1784 (1994).
25 In re Queen's Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1290-91 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
26 Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 8.
27 Id. at 8-9 (quoting Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980)).
28 See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974) ("[E]xceptions to the demands
for every man's evidence are not lightly created nor expansively construed, for they are in
derogation of the search for truth.").
29 Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 50 (1980) (quoting Elkins v. United States,
364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
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draft patent applications and negotiate with the Patent Office to issue patents.30
Like the patent system itself, patent agents have been around for a very long
time.31 The profession first took off in the 1830s thanks to the Patent Act of
1836, which marked the beginning of the modem patent examination system.32
Over the next century, various efforts were made to monitor and regulate pa-
tent agents. In the 1860s, for example, Congress granted the Commissioner of
Patents the right to ban an individual from practicing before the Patent Office
for "gross misconduct."33 Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Patent
Office imposed a new registration requirement, mandating that individuals
who wished to prosecute patents first demonstrate certain legal and technical
competence.34 Ultimately, the Patent Office began requiring patent agents to
pass a written test, which is currently called the Registration Examination or,
more colloquially, the Patent Bar.3 5
Today, lawyers and non-lawyers alike continue to practice before the PTO.
Both groups of practitioners-generally referred to as "patent lawyers" and
"patent agents," respectively-have passed the Registration Examination.36
Unlike their lawyer counterparts, however, patent agents are not licensed by
any state to practice law.37 Because they have one foot in the legal world,
questions abound about the status of patent agents, starting with whether they
are engaging in the unauthorized practice of law.
A. Patent Agents and the Practice ofLaw
Patent agents are non-lawyers who undoubtedly perform legal tasks. They
conduct prior art searches, prepare patent applications, present legal arguments
to the PTO, and draft validity opinions.38 Of course, patent agents are not the
only non-lawyer professionals who undertake legal work. Paralegals,39 tax
30 See Christi J. Guerrini, The Decline of the Patent Registration Exam, 91 NEB. L. REV.
325, 332 (2012); David Hricik, Patent Agents: The Person You Are, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 261, 263-64 (2007).
3' Lisa Kennedy, Patent Agents: Non-Attorneys Representing Inventors before the Pa-
tent Office, 49 THE ADVOCATE 21 (2006).
32 See Guerrini, supra note 30, at 331-32 (explaining that the 1836 Act "toughen[ed] the
standards for obtaining a patent," and thereby "created a new professional niche: the patent
prosecutor"); Mark A. Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide ifPatents are Valid?, 99 VA. L. REV.
1673, 1697 (2013) ("[T]he 1836 Act established what we know today as the Patent and
Trademark Office.").
3 Act ofMarch 2, 1861, 12 Stat. 246, ch. 88 § 8 (1861).
34 See Guerrini, supra note 30, at 335-36.
35 Id. at 337-38.
36 Hricik, supra note 2, at 265.
37 See id.
3 Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 382-83 (1963).
39 AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIAnON, Current ABA Definition ofLegal Assistant/Paralegal
(2008),
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consultants,40 and real estate brokers4 1 are all "legal" professionals to varying
degrees. But because of their unique role in the patent system, and the extent
of legal work performed, the Supreme Court ultimately had to decide in Sperry
v. State of Florida whether patent agents in fact engage in the unauthorized
practice of law.42
In Sperry, the Florida Bar instituted proceedings in the Florida Supreme
Court against Alexander Sperry, a patent agent, seeking to enjoin him from en-
gaging in the unauthorized practice of law.43 The Florida Bar claimed that,
although not a member of any state bar, Sperry (i) maintains an office in Tam-
pa, Florida, (ii) holds himself out as a patent attorney, (iii) represents clients
before the PTO, (iv) renders patentability opinions, and (v) prepares and files
patent applications with the PTO." Sperry conceded these allegations, but ar-
gued that this did not constitute unauthorized practice because he only per-
formed work before the PTO.45 The Florida Supreme Court rejected these ar-
guments and enjoined Sperry from continuing this work.46 The U.S. Supreme
Court granted certiorari and reversed.47
For starters, the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that preparing and prosecuting
patent applications constitutes the practice of law.48 In the Court's view,
[s]uch conduct inevitably requires the practitioner to consider.
and advise his clients as to the patentability of their inventions
under the statutory criteria . . . as well as to consider the ad-
visability of relying upon alternative forms of protection
which may be available under state law. It also involves his
participation in the drafting of the specification and claims of
the patent application ... which this Court long ago noted
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/paralegals/resources/current-abadefinition of legal_a
ssistantparalegal.html [https://perma.cc/P4HA-5QRP]. The ABA defines a paralegal as "a
person, qualified by education, training or work experience who is employed or retained by
a lawyer, law office, corporation, governmental agency or other entity and who performs
specifically delegated substantive legal work for which a lawyer is responsible."
4 See Humphreys v. Comm'r, 88 F.2d 430, 432 (2d Cir. 1937) (stating "[h]ow any ac-
countant doing income tax work could do his business at all without a knowledge of the
statutes, decisions, and treasury rulings in income tax matters is hard to see, and we should
hesitate to hold that the necessity of such knowledge would require every member of a firm
of accountants to be a member of the bar"); see also 31 C.F.R. § 10.4(b) (2006) (authorizing
"enrolled agents" to render legal advice concerning federal income tax laws).
41 See, e.g., Creekmore v. Izard, 236 Ark. 558, 565 (1963) (holding that real estate bro-
kers may complete legal forms on behalf of clients in certain circumstances).
42 Sperry, 373 U.S. at 381.
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 381-82.
46 Id. at 382.
47 Id. at 383, 404.
48 Id. at 383.
2017] 355
B.U J. SCI. & TECH. L.
"constitutes one of the most difficult legal instruments to
draw with accuracy.". . . And upon rejection of the applica-
tion, the practitioner may also assist in the preparation of
amendments ... which frequently requires written argument
to establish the patentability of the claimed invention under
the applicable rules of law and in light of the prior art.49
Sperry, therefore, makes clear that patent agents "are not simply engaging in
law-like activity," but are indeed practicing law.50
Contrary to the Florida Supreme Court, however, Sperry held that the prac-
tice of law by patent agents is not unauthorized.51 Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 31,
Congress provided the PTO power to "prescribe regulations governing the
recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing ap-
plicants or other parties before the Patent Office." 52 The PTO accordingly
promulgated a regulation that permitted patent applicants to be "represented by
an attorney or agent authorized to practice before the Patent Office in patent
cases."53 Thus, relying on Supremacy Clause principles,54 the Supreme Court
concluded that patent agents like Sperry may continue to practice law.55 That
said, the Court emphasized that a patent agent's practice must be limited to
conduct before the PTO as specifically authorized by federal law.5 6
As is often true with landmark decisions, Sperry resolved certain issues
while simultaneously sparking new debates. If patent agents practice law,
must they comply with the same ethical rules as lawyers?57 And if patent
49 I
so In re Queen's Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1296 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
' Sperry, 373 U.S. at 385.
52 Today, this grant of authority is set out in 35 U.S.C. § 2(b), which provides: "The Of-
fice-(2) may establish regulations, not inconsistent with law, which-(D) may govern the
recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or
other parties before the Office, and may require them, before being recognized as represent-
atives of applicants or other persons, to show that they are of good moral character and
reputation and are possessed of the necessary qualifications to render to applicants or other
persons valuable service, advice, and assistance in the presentation or prosecution of their
applications or other business before the Office." 35 U.S.C. § 2(b) (2012).
53 37 C.F.R. § 1.31 (1949) (emphasis added).
54 U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
" Sperry, 373 U.S. at 385 ("A State may not enforce licensing requirements which,
though valid in the absence of federal regulation, give 'the State's licensing board a virtual
power of review over the federal determination' that a person or agency is qualified and en-
titled to perform certain functions.").
56 Id. at 402; Charles H. Kuck & Olesia Gorinshteyn, Unauthorized Practice of Immi-
gration Law in the Context of Supreme Court's Decision in Sperry v. Florida, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 340, 352 (2008) ("The Sperry 'federal practice exception' to the unau-
thorized practice rules . . . applies only where there is a federal statute specifically authoriz-
ing such practice.").
" See Hricik, supra note 2, at 266 (arguing that patent agents are properly treated as
356 [Vol. 23:350
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agents are allowed to represent clients, are their communications privileged
and thus shielded from discovery? The Federal Circuit recently resolved the
latter question in Queen's University.58 Before discussing that decision, how-
ever, a brief explanation of the state of the law leading up to Queen 's Universi-
ty is in order.
B. Patent Agents and the Attorney-Client Privilege
In certain circumstances, as noted above, courts have been willing to extend
the attorney-client privilege to non-lawyers.59 With respect to patent agents,
however, district courts were sharply divided on this issue for many years.60
Even within a single district, opinions on whether to treat patent agent commu-
nications as privileged have gone both ways.61
United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp. was one of the first cases ad-
dressing the issue of patent agent privilege.62 In United Shoe-which, notably,
was decided before Sperry-the court refused to protect communications with
patent agents since they are not attorneys licensed to practice law.63 The court
minimized the role of patent agents, likening them to "employees with legal
training who serve in the mortgage or trust departments of a bank or in the
claims department of an insurance company."64 The court concluded that such
communications were not privileged and, therefore, must be disclosed.65
One might expect Sperry to have quickly turned the tides in favor of protect-
ing communications by patent agents, but that was not the case. Instead, dis-
trict courts splintered and ended up all over the map on the privilege issue.66
lawyers for purposes of discipline by the Patent Office).
58 In re Queen's Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
5 See supra Part I.
6 See Gregory J. Battersby & Charles W. Grimes, The Attorney-Client Privilege and
Work Product Immunity in the Eyes of the Accused Infringer, 15 AIPLA Q.J. 231, 239-41
(1987); Hricik, supra note 2, at 282-83 ("The courts disagree on even the most basic ques-
tion of whether communications in the United States between patent agents and their clients
can be privileged.").
61 Compare Mold-Masters, Ltd. v. Husky Injection Molding Sys., Ltd., No. 01C1576,
2001 WL 1268587, at *4 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (holding that patent agent communications were
protected by attorney-client privilege), with Sneider v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.R.D. 1, 5
(N.D. Ill. 1980) (holding that patent agent communications were not protected by attorney-
client privilege).
62 United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950).
63 Id. at 360.
6 Id.
65 Id. at 361.
66 See Hricik, supra note 2, at 283 (explaining that courts are divided on patent agent
privilege "which leads to uncertainty during prosecution as to whether communications will
be privileged and extensive briefing and argument during patent litigation over whether
communications claimed as privileged are properly withheld").
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Some courts did in fact decide that patent agent communications are shielded
by the attorney-client privilege. Two cases in particular- Vernitron Medical
Prods., Inc. v. Baxter Labs., Inc.67 and In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation68-
were influential in this regard. Vernitron, one of the earliest in this line of cas-
es, reasoned that the underlying purpose of the attorney-client privilege
"appl[ies] with equal force to an . . . applicant for a patent and the representa-
tive engaged to handle the matter for him, whether he be a 'patent attorney' or
a 'patent agent,' so long as he is registered by the Patent Office." 69 Ampicillin,
by contrast, relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Sperry and held that the
attorney-client privilege must protect patent agents so as "not to frustrate [the]
congressional scheme" that allows clients to be represented before the PTO by
either a patent lawyer or a patent agent.70
On the flip side, however, many district courts continued to reject privilege
claims on the same grounds as United Shoe-that patent agents are not law-
yers.71 Others held that the attorney-client privilege didn't apply to patent
agents because they work independently of lawyers, unlike other non-lawyer
professionals such as paralegals.72 More recent decisions have refused to ex-
tend the attorney-client privilege to patent agents because it "is rooted, both
historically and philosophically, in the special role that lawyers have. . .to give
legal advice."73 And finally, as discussed in the next Part, the lower court in
Queen 's University denied protection for patent agent communications because
67 Vernitron Medical Prods., Inc. v. Baxter Labs., Inc., 186 U.S.P.Q. 324 (D.N.J. 1975).
68 In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377 (D.D.C. 1978).
69 Vernitron, 186 U.S.P.Q. at 325.
70 Ampicillin, 81 F.R.D. at 393; see also James N. Willi, Proposal for a Uniform Feder-
al Common Law of Attorney-Client Privilege for Communications with U.S. and Foreign
Patent Practitioners, 13 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 279, 304 (2005) ("The court concluded that
the attorney-client privilege should be extended to protect confidential communications be-
tween clients and U.S. patent agents to fulfill the congressional intent of allowing clients to
choose freely between a patent attorney and a registered patent agent for representation in
patent proceedings.").
71 See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1169 (D.S.C.
1974); Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 40 (D. Md. 1974); Rayette-Faberge,
Inc. v. John Oster Mfg. Co., 47 F.R.D. 524, 526 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
72 E.g., Sneider v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 91 F.R.D. 1, 5 (N.D. 111. 1980). Courts gener-
ally agree, however, that when patent agents work in conjunction with attorneys, their com-
munications are privileged. E.g., In re Queen's Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1295
(Fed. Cir. 2016) ("Samsung concedes that, where a patent agent communicates with counsel
or receives communications between client and counsel, the attorney-client privilege may
protect those communications from discovery.").
7 Agfa Corp. v. Creo Prods., Inc., No. CIV.A. 00-10836GAO, 2002 WL 1787533, at *2
(D. Mass. Aug. 1, 2002); see also In re Rivastigmine Patent Litigation, 237 F.R.D. 69, 102
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) ("It does not follow that because the agent is permitted to engage in this
defined subuniverse of legal practice, his activities are therefore equivalent o those of a
practicing attorney.").
358 [Vol. 23:350
Privilege for Patent Agents
the attorney-client privilege must be "strictly construed," and the Federal Cir-
cuit had not yet recognized a "patent agent privilege."74
III. THE PATENT AGENT PRIVILEGE
For more than half a century, district courts were at odds with each other
over the question whether communications with patent agents should be
deemed privileged. Last year, the Federal Circuit finally waded into this de-
bate and created a new patent agent privilege in Queen's University.7 5 While
the Federal Circuit's decision goes a long way, questions remain about how
communications with patent agents will be treated going forward. In recent
months, the PTO has taken steps toward addressing some of those uncertain-
ties, at least with respect to matters before the PTAB. 76
A. In re Queen's University
1. Lower Court Decision
The facts underlying Queen's University are relatively straightforward.
Queen's University (QU), a Canadian university located in Ontario, is the as-
signee of three patents directed to Attentive User Interfaces (AUI). 77 AUls "al-
low devices to change their behavior based on the attentiveness of a user"-
e.g., a video pauses when the user loses eye contact with the device.78 In 2014,
QU filed a patent infringement action against Samsung in the U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas alleging that Samsung's SmartPause
feature on many of its newest devices infringes the AUI patents.
79 The case
was set for trial in November 2015.80
During discovery, Samsung sought production of communications between
QU and the patent agents who prosecuted the patents-in-suit.8
1 When QU re-
fused to produce the documents on privilege grounds, Samsung moved to
compel.82 Magistrate Judge Roy Payne held a hearing in June 2015, and grant-
ed Samsung's motion to compel.83 In so doing, Judge Payne recognized that
the lower courts were divided on the question whether patent agent communi-
74 Transcript of Motions Hearing Before the Honorable Roy S. Payne, United States
Magistrate Judge, at 40, Queen's Univ. at Kingston v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2015 WL
2250384 (E.D. Tex. 2015) (No. 2:14-cv-0053-JRG-RSP) [hereinafter "Motion to Compel
Transcript"].
7 In re Queen's University at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
76 See infra Part III.B.
n In re Queen's University at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2016).





83 Motion to Compel Transcript, supra note 74, at 39-48.
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cations were protected by the attorney-client privilege.84 But, he opined, the
attorney-client privilege must be "strictly construed,"85 and thus cannot be re-
lied upon to protect the communications at issue because the patent agents in-
volved were not attorneys, nor were they being supervised by attorneys.86
Judge Payne stated on the record that he considered the rationale of Ampicillin,
but was not persuaded by it.8 Judge Payne further explained that there may be
a need for the creation of a "patent agent privilege," but that the Federal Circuit
had not yet spoken on that question.8 8 Accordingly, Judge Payne granted the
motion to compel, but agreed to stay execution of the order while QU sought
review of the decision.89
QU first filed on objection to Judge Payne's order, which was overruled by
District Judge Rodney Gilstrap.90 *QU then asked Judge Gilstrap to certify the
issue for interlocutory appeal, which he also refused to do.91 Judge Gilstrap
was willing, however, to stay the production of the allegedly-privileged docu-
ments pending a petition for writ of mandamus.92 Thus, on July 20, 2015, QU
filed such a petition,93 which the Federal Circuit ultimately granted in a 2-1 de-
cision.94
2. Federal Circuit Decision
The Federal Circuit's opinion in Queen's University is three-staged. The
court had to decide (1) whose law should apply to the privilege question, (2)
whether mandamus was appropriate, and (3) whether patent agent communica-
tions are privileged. With respect to the choice of law question, the Federal
Circuit determined it would apply its own law, rather than the law of the re-
84 Id. at 40-42.
8s Id. at 40.
8 Id. at 41 ("I believe that the better view is that the courts like the Southern District of
California, the Southern District of New York, the District of Massachusetts, and the Dis-
trict of Maryland, among others, have taken i  ... saying that patent agents who are not at-
torneys and are not practicing under the direct supervision of an attorney are not covered by
the attorney-client privilege.").
8 Id. at 40-41 ("I think the Congressional policy was to allow inventors the less expen-
sive alternative of having a non-attorney patent agent prosecute their patents before the PTO
if they wanted to. I don't think that means that all of the laws and policies about attorneys,
therefore, apply to non-attorney patent agents.").
8 Id. at 40-42.
8 Motion to Compel Transcript, supra note 74, at 46-47. When QU's attorney told
Judge Payne that her client intended to seek guidance on this issue from the Federal Circuit,
he said "[t]hat'd be great," and "I would love it."
90 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1290.
9' Id.
92 Id.
93 Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re Queen's Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287 (Fed.
Cir. 2015) (No. 15-145).
94 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1302.
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gional circuit, since patent agent communications "are potentially relevant to
numerous substantive issues of patent law, including claim construction, va-
lidity, and inequitable conduct."95 The court then granted mandamus review
because lower courts were sharply divided on whether patent agent privilege
exists, and this was a matter of first impression for the Federal Circuit.96
Turning to the merits, the Federal Circuit decided in a 2-1 opinion that pa-
tent agent communications should be protected.97 The court began by explain-
ing that, similar to other non-lawyer professionals, the attorney-client privilege
may be available to a patent agent "who communicates with counsel or re-
ceives communications between his client and counsel."98 But the more diffi-
cult question-and the one at issue in Queen's University--was whether to ex-
pand the attorney-client privilege or recognize a new privilege for
communications between patent agents and clients when no lawyer is in-
volved.99 The majority, which included Judges O'Malley and Lourie, deter-
mined that the time had come to create a new patent agent privilege.0 0
The majority justified this new privilege on several grounds. First and
foremost, the court relied heavily on Sperry and its holding that Congress has
authorized patent agents to engage in the practice of law.101 Congress has es-
tablished a system whereby patent applicants are given a choice to hire either a
9' In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1291. Since its creation in 1982, the Federal Circuit
has grappled with what law to apply to procedural issues in patent cases-its own law or the
law of the regional circuit from which the case originated. The Federal Circuit takes the
position that regional circuit law should usually apply unless the procedural question is
"unique to patent issues," Panduit Corp. v. All States Plastic Mfg. Co., 744 F.2d 1564,
1574-75 (Fed. Cir. 1984), or "intimately involved in the substance of enforcement of the
patent right," Flex-Foot, Inc. v. CRP, Inc., 238 F.3d 1362, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (internal
quotations omitted), in which case Federal Circuit law applies.
96 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1291-92.
7 Id. at 1302.
98 Id. at 1295; see also id. at 1305 (Reyna, J., dissenting) ("In today's practice, patent
agent communications are usually found privileged when an agent is working under the su-
pervision of an attorney.").
94 Id. at 1295.
1 Id. at 1301 ("Communications between non-attorney patent agents and their clients
that are in furtherance of the performance of these tasks, or 'which are reasonably necessary
and incident to the preparation and prosecution of patent applications or other proceeding[s]
before the Office involving a patent application or patent in which the practitioner is author-
ized to participate' receive the benefit of the patent-agent privilege.") (citing 37 C.F.R §
11.5(b)(1) (2012)). Notably, the court did not explain why it opted to create a new privilege
rather than expanding the attorney-client privilege as some lower courts had done.
101 Id. at 1295-96 ("For the reasons we explain, we find that the unique roles of patent
agents, the congressional recognition of their authority to act, the Supreme Court's charac-
terization of their activities as the practice of law, and the current realities of patent litigation
counsel in favor of recognizing an independent patent-agent privilege.").
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patent attorney or a patent agent to prosecute patents.102 Clients who opt for
patent agents have a reasonable expectation that their communications will be
privileged since those agents are-as permitted by Congress-practicing
law. 103 Holding otherwise, the majority reasoned, would "frustrate the very
purpose of Congress's design: namely to afford clients the freedom to choose
between an attorney and a patent agent for representation before the Patent Of-
fice."04 Simply put, the majority's rationale in Queen's University harkens
back to Ampicillin, a case decided almost four decades ago.105
Second, the majority cited the unique role of patent agents, and their storied
history, to support the creation of this new privilege.106 Patent agents have
been prosecuting patents before the Patent Office for close to two centuries.0 7
Complaints about patent agents, unsurprisingly, have arisen over the years. In
1899, for example, "non-attorney agents were found 'particularly responsible
for the deceptive advertising and victimization of inventors' at the Patent Of-
fice." 0 8 Instead of simply prohibiting patent agents from practice, however,
Congress-through the PTO-addressed these problems by regulating patent
agents' conduct and mandating that they meet certain requirements. 109 This
suggests that Congress and the PTO believe that patent agents, as technical ex-
perts in their field, offer valuable services to inventors and others seeking pa-
tent protection, despite not having a law license. 10 A patent agent privilege, in
other words, is long overdue.
Finally, the Queen's University majority reasoned that a patent agent privi-
lege advances the public interest much like the attorney-client and spousal
privileges."' Just as those traditional privileges are "rooted in the imperative
102 Id. at 1298 ("Ultimately, Congress endorsed a system in which patent applicants can
choose between patent agents and patent attorneys when prosecuting patents before the Pa-
tent Office.").
03 Id. ("To the extent Congress has authorized non-attorney patent agents to engage in
the practice of law before the Patent Office, reason and experience compel us to recognize a
patent-agent privilege that is coextensive with the rights granted to patent agents by Con-
gress.").
104 Id.
'0 In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 81 F.R.D. 377, 393 (1978) ("That freedom of
selection, protected by the Supreme Court in Sperry, would, however, be substantially im-
paired if as basic a protection as the attorney-client privilege were afforded to communica-
tions involving patent attorneys but not to those involving patent agents.").
"o6 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1297.
107 Id. at 1296 (explaining that the Patent Office has been regulating agents since the
1860s).
08 Id. at 1297 (quoting Sperry v. Florida, 83 S. Ct. 1322, 1329 (1963)).
' In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1296-97 (describing the Rules and Directions issued
by the Commissioner).
110 Id. at 1297 (citing the legislative record for the proposition that "it never occurred to"
lawmakers that patent agents should be members of a state bar).
I Id. at 1300.
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need for confidence and trust,"1l 2 so is the patent agent privilege because,
without it, clients would not engage in the frank conversations necessary to
protect the public interest.113 Patent agents, of course, act on behalf of their
clients when prosecuting patents. Yet, "[a] patent by its very nature is affected
with a public interest,"'14 so patent agents also have responsibilities to the
public at large.'15 To that end, PTO regulations require that:
The public interest is best served, and the most effective pa-
tent examination occurs when, at the time an application is
examined, the Office is aware of and evaluates the teachings
of all information material to patentability. Each individual
associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent applica-
tion has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with the
Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all in-
formation known to that individual to be material to patenta-
bility . . . .116
This duty of candor is supposed to help separate the inventions that are
"worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent," 1 7 from those
that are not.118 Recognizing a patent agent privilege will facilitate frank com-
munication among clients and patent agents, thereby ensuring that clients re-
ceive the advice necessary to comply with the duty of candor and protect the
public from invalid patents.1 19
Having created the patent agent privilege, the next step was for the Federal
112 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996).
"3 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1300 ("[T]he lack of a patent-agent privilege would
hinder communications between patent agents and their clients . . . .").
114 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945);
see 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2016).
us See generally Megan M. La Belle, Patent Law as Public Law, 20 GEO. MASON L.
REv. 41 (2012).
116 37 C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (2016).
117 See Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813), in 13 THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 326, 335 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery Bergh
eds., 1903) ("Considering the exclusive right to invention as given not of natural right, but
for the benefit of society, I know well the difficulty of drawing a line between the things
which are worth to the public the embarrassment of an exclusive patent, and those which are
not.").
"8 See David Hricik, Aerial Boundaries: The Duty of Candor as a Limitation on the Du-
ty of Patent Practitioners to Advocate for Maximum Patent Coverage, 44 S. TEX. L. REv.
205, 219-20 (2002) ("[T]he essential purpose of the Patent Office is to uncover what others
had known or used before the applicant conceived of his invention and determine whether
the applicant's invention as described in the claims of his application is patentably distinct
from prior inventions.").
' In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d 1287, 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("[T]he lack of a patent-
agent privilege would hinder communications between patent agents and their clients.").
3632017]
B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L.
Circuit to define its scope.120 The court stressed that the privilege would be
limited to communications between non-attorney patent agents and their clients
that are "reasonably necessary and incident to" the performance of tasks au-
thorized by Congress.121 PTO regulations provide that such tasks include, but
are not limited to,
preparing and prosecuting ... patent application[s], consult-
ing with or giving advice to a client in contemplation of filing
a patent application or other document with the Office, draft-
ing the specification or claims of a patent application; drafting
an amendment or reply to a communication for the Office that
may require written argument to establish the patentability of
a claimed invention; drafting a reply to a communication for
the Office regarding a patent application; and drafting a
communication for a public use, interference, reexamination
proceeding, petition, appeal to or any other proceeding before
the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, or other proceeding.122
The Federal Circuit explained, on the other hand, that some types of com-
munications would not be covered by this new privilege.123 Examples includ-
ed communications with patent agents who offer opinions on validity or in-
fringement in connection with either litigation or the sale or purchase of
patents.124
Returning to the case at hand, the majority granted QU's mandamus petition
and reversed the lower court's decision on Samsung's motion to compel.125
The Federal Circuit remanded the case for the district court to assess whether
the particular patent agent communications at issue should be shielded from
discovery under the newly-created privilege.126
Judge Reyna wrote a lengthy dissent in Queen's University disagreeing with
the court's decision to create a patent agent privilege.127 Because some of
Judge Reyna's concerns will be discussed in Part IV of this Article, I will just
120 Id. at 1301-02.
121 Id. at 1301.
122 37 C.F.R. § I 1.5(b)(1) (2016).
123 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1301-02.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 1302.
126 Id. The district court has not yet decided the privilege question because the case was
stayed pending resolution of Samsung's inter partes review proceedings at the PTO. See
Joint Status Report at 1, Queen's Univ. at Kingston v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2015 WL
2250384 (E.D. Tex. 2016) (No. 2:14-cv-0053-JRG-RSP). In the fall of 2015, the PTO in-
validated all the claims of the patents-in-suit. Id. Queen's University's appeal to the Feder-
al Circuit is currently pending and will likely be heard later this year. See Brief for Appel-
lant, Queen's Univ. at Kingston v. Samsung Elecs. Co., Ltd., 2017 WL 238953, at *1 (Fed.
Cir. 2017) (Nos. 2016-2723, 2016-2725).
127 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1302-16.
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briefly summarize his dissent here.128 Judge Reyna emphasized, as an initial
matter, that there is a presumption against the creation of new privileges be-
cause of a "promise that our justice system shall remain open to the public."1 29
The presumption was not overcome, in Judge Reyna's opinion, because patent
agents and lawyers are different, there's no pressing need for the privilege, the
privilege does not advance the public interest, and the new privilege is compli-
cated and uncertain.130
The dissent argued, first, that the fact Congress has authorized patent agents
to practice before the PTO doesn't mean that patent agents are vested with all
the benefits and obligations of an attorney.131 Rather, both Congress and the
Supreme Court (in Sperry) have recognized that patent agents are not on equal
footing with patent lawyers since they aren't licensed to practice law, so it's
perfectly appropriate to treat them differently for privilege purposes.132 The
dissent next asserted that there's no pressing need for this new privilege be-
cause most patent agents are supervised by lawyers, and therefore their com-
munications are already protected by the attorney-client privilege.133 And even
where the attorney-client privilege doesn't apply, Judge Reyna claimed, clients
are already incentivized to be frank with their patent agents because the duty of
candor requires disclosure of information material to patentability.134 Thus,
the new privilege will only encourage disclosure of immaterial information-
doing nothing to advance the public interest.135 Finally, but perhaps most im-
portantly, the dissent points out the many questions left unanswered by this
opinion, such as the extent to which the patent agent privilege will apply in
certain PTO proceedings.136
128 See infra Part TV.
129 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1303.
130 Id. at 1303-09.
131 Id. at 1308.
132 Id.
133 Id. at 1305. Judge Reyna also suggests that the patent agent privilege is unnecessary
because "patent agents and their clients have the opportunity to delete and destroy emails
and other correspondence in the period of time between when they are exchanged and when
they would be sought in litigation." Id. at 1305. While this is sometimes true, patent litiga-
tion is often initiated almost immediately after issuance of a patent. See, e.g., Advanced
Cardiovascular Sys. v. Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1298, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (patent
issued one month before filing of complaint); Nat'l Presto Indus., Inc. v. West Bend Co., 76
F.3d 1185, 1193 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (suit commenced on day patent issued); Power Lift, Inc. v.
Lang Tools, Inc., 774 F.2d 478, 482 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (patent suit filed nine days after patent
issued); State Indus. Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (infringement
action filed twenty-two days after patent issued).
134 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1303.
13s Id. at 1304.
136 Id. at 1305-06.
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B. The PTO's Proposed Privilege Rule
Historically, the role of patent agents was limited to ex ante proceedings be-
fore the PTO.1 37 Agents conducted prior art searches, advised clients about pa-
tentability, drafted patent applications, and negotiated with the PTO regarding
issuance of the patent.'38 That began to change in the 1980s, however, as Con-
gress created various ex post proceedings for challenging patents at the PTO.139
The initial proceedings included ex parte reexamination ("reexam") and inter
partes reexamination, established in 1980 and 1999, respectively.140 The pas-
sage of the AIA in 2011 introduced three new types of post-grant administra-
tive proceedings-inter partes review (IPR), post-grant review (PGR), and
covered business method review (CBM)--to be heard by the newly-established
PTAB.141
Unlike their predecessors, PTAB proceedings have been extremely popular
with 6,961 petitions filed between September 16, 2012 and May 31, 2017.142
PTO regulations permit parties in PTAB proceedings to be represented by ei-
ther patent lawyers or patent agents.143 Although these proceedings occur be-
fore the PTO like traditional patent prosecution activities, they are adjudicative
in nature and, in many ways, resemble patent litigation in federal court." In-
deed, Congress created these new post-grant proceedings, at least in part, to
provide a more efficient and less expensive alternative to federal court litiga-
tion for patent disputes.145 One way Congress hoped to encourage parties to
use PTAB proceedings was by allowing them to engage in limited discov-
ery.146
"I See Megan M. La Belle, Public Enforcement of Patent Law, 96 B.U. L. REv. 1865,
1887 (2016) (explaining that, for the first 150 years of its history, the PTO's role was lim-
ited to reviewing patents ex ante).
13 See, e.g., Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963) (discussing the practice of pa-
tent agents).
13 See, e.g., La Belle, supra note 137, at 1887-89.
140 Id.
141 Id. at 1889-90.
142 USPTO, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 1, 2 (May 31, 2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/TrialStatistics2017-05-31 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/5Z97-96M].
143 37 C.F.R. § 11.5 (2012).
144 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Giving the Federal Circuit a Run for its Money:
Challenging Patents in the PTAB, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 235, 243-49 (2015) (detailing
each of the new PTAB proceedings).
145 See, e.g., 157 Cong. Rec. S7413 (daily ed. Nov. 14, 2011) (letter of Rep. Lamar
Smith) (CBM review "creates an inexpensive and speedy alternative to litigation"); H.R.
Rep. No. 112-98, pt. 1, at 48 (2011) (post-grant review procedures are intended to be "quick
and cost effective alternatives to litigation"); 157 Cong. Rec. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011)
(statement of Sen. Grassley) (new AIA proceedings were to provide "faster, less costly al-
ternatives to civil litigation to challenge patents").
146 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5) (2012) ("The Director shall prescribe regulations ... setting
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In a typical IPR, for instance, parties are entitled to receive "any exhibit cit-
ed in a paper or in testimony," and depositions of the opposing party's declar-
ants are par for the course.147 Moreover, as a matter of routine discovery, par-
ties must produce any non-privileged information that is inconsistent with their
position.148 By way of example, PTO regulations state: "[W]here a patent
owner relies upon surprising and unexpected results to rebut an allegation of
obviousness, the patent owner should provide the petitioner with non-
privileged evidence that is inconsistent with the contention of unexpected
properties."1 49  Thus, privilege questions-including whether patent agent
communications are exempt from discovery-arise frequently in PTAB pro-
ceedings, and must be decided on a case-by-case basis.15 0
Aware of the uncertainties facing PTAB litigants, the PTO launched an ef-
fort about two years ago to explore how best to address this privilege problem.
The agency began by hosting a roundtable and soliciting comments in early
2015.151 Specifically, the agency sought input on whether it should treat com-
munications with U.S. patent agents or foreign patent practitioners as privi-
leged "to the same extent as communications between U.S. patent attorneys
and patent applicants and owners."1 52 Close to twenty trade organizations,
companies, and individuals submitted comments, and they uniformly support-
ed the recognition of such a privilege.153 Stakeholders expressed varying opin-
ions, though, on how the privilege should be created and 'what its scope should
be.154
The PTO's next step was to solicit further comments in connection with a
proposal to amend various rules of practice for PTAB proceedings.1 5 5 In Au-
gust 2015, the agency published a notice in the Federal Register and asked for
forth standards and procedures for discovery of relevant evidence .... ).
"' Discovery 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(i) (2014); see also Mary R. Henninger et al., Nav-
igating the Limitations on Discovery in AIA Post-Grant Proceedings, 11 BUFF. INTELL.
PROP. L.J. 135, 140-41 (2015) (discussing how discovery in PTAB proceedings typically
proceeds).
148 Discovery, 37 C.F.R. § 42.51(b)(1)(iii) (2014).
149 Office Patent Trial Practice Guide, 77 Fed. Reg. 48756, 48761 (Aug. 14, 2012).
ISO See, e.g., GEA Process Eng'g, Inc. v. Steuben Foods, Inc., IPR2014-00041, 2014
WL 4274080 (P.T.A.B. 2014).
151 See Notice of Roundtable and Request for Comments on Domestic and International
Issues Related to Privileged Communications Between Patent Practitioners and Their Cli-
ents, 80 Fed. Reg. 3953 (Jan. 26, 2015).
152 Rule Recognizing Privileged Communication between Clients and Patent Practition-
ers at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 71653, 71654 (Oct. 18, 2016).
153 USPTO, SUMMARY OF ROUNDTABLE AND WRITTEN COMMENTS: DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL ISSUES RELATED TO PRIVILEGED COMUNICATIONS BETWEEN PATENT
PRACTITIONERS AND THEIR CLIENTS (2015).
154 Id.
155 Amendments to the Rules of Practice for Trials Before the Patent Trial and Appeal
Board, 80 Fed. Reg. 50720 (Aug. 20, 2015).
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comments from the public on the subject of "attorney-client privilege or other
limitations on discovery in PTAB proceedings."'5 6 All the commentators once
again agreed that patent agent communications hould be protected, and over-
whelmingly favored the PTO promulgating such a rule.'57 The American In-
tellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA), for example, argued that "[i]f
patent agents are not entitled to have their communications be considered
privileged.. .then their utility-and associated cost savings for stakeholders-
is lost."'' 58
Finally, in October 2016, the PTO published in the Federal Register a No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking adopting a privilege rule for patent agents in
PTAB proceedings.159 The proposed rule reads as follows:
§ 42.57 Privilege for patent practitioners.
(a) Privileged communications. A communication between a
client and a domestic or foreign patent practitioner that is rea-
sonably necessary or incident to the scope of the patent practi-
tioner's authority shall receive the same protections of privi-
lege as if that communication were between a client and an
attorney authorized to practice in the United States, including
all limitations and exceptions.
(b) Definitions. The term "domestic patent practitioner"
means a person who is registered by the United States Patent
and Trademark Office to practice before the agency under
section 11.6. "Foreign patent practitioner" means a person
who is authorized to provide legal advice on patent matters in
a foreign jurisdiction, provided that the jurisdiction establish-
es professional qualifications and the practitioner satisfies
them, and regardless of whether that jurisdiction provides
privilege or an equivalent under its laws.160
The proposed rule is consistent with the privilege created in Queen's Uni-
versity to the extent that they both protect communications that "are reasonably
necessary or incident to" tasks within the practitioner's authority.'6' Like the
156 Id. at 50743.
11 Rule Recognizing Privileged Communications Between Clients and Patent Practi-
tioners at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 71653, 71655 (Oct. 18, 2016).
158 See Letter from Sharon A. Israel, President of the American Intellectual Property
Law Assoc. to Michelle K. Lee, Under Secretary of Commerce for Intellectual Property and
Director of the USPTO, (Oct. 21, 2015).
`9 Rule Recognizing Privileged Communications Between Clients and Patent Practi-
tioners at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 71653 (Oct. 18, 2016).
160 Id. at 71657.
161 Id.; In re Queen's Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2016) ("Com-
munications that are not reasonably necessary and incident to the prosecution of patents be-
fore the Patent Office fall outside the scope of the patent agent privilege.").
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Federal Circuit in Queen's University, the PTO attempted to clarify the scope
of the privilege by providing examples of communications that would not be
covered: "For instance, communications between clients and U.S. patent
agents relating to patent application matters would be protected as privileged
under the rule, but communications between these parties regarding litigation
strategies would not be protected."1 62
In some important ways, however, the proposed rule goes beyond the Feder-
al Circuit's patent agent privilege. For example, the PTO's rule covers com-
munications between clients and "patent practitioners," which includes foreign
patent agents, while Queen's University addressed only patent agents author-
ized to practice before the USPTO.16 3 Additionally, Queen's University did
not expand the attorney-client privilege to cover patent agent communications,
but instead created a new patent agent privilege.164 The PTO rule, by contrast,
appears to be grounded in the attorney-client privilege.165
The PTO received approximately twenty comments from some of the same
organizations that provided feedback earlier in the process, including AIPLA
and the Intellectual Property Owners Association.166 While generally support-
ing adoption of a privilege rule, a number of commentators raised concerns
about ambiguities in the PTO's proposed language and confusion about how
the rule would apply in various factual situations.167 Many of those concerns
are explored in the final Part of this Article.
IV. THE FUTURE OF THE PATENT AGENT PRIVIEGE
The decision whether to protect patent agent communications is driven by
policy considerations. In simple terms, if we want to encourage inventors and
others to rely on patent agents, their communications should be privileged; if
162 Rule Recognizing Privileged Communications Between Clients and Patent Practi-
tioners at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 Fed. Reg., at 71655.
163 See, e.g., Charles Suh, et al., New Privilege Considerations for Korean Patent Practi-
tioners, LAw360 (Mar. 6, 6017), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/886890/new-privilege-
considerations-for-korean-patent-practitioners ("Until additional cases shed light on what
impact In re Queen's will have on how U.S. courts treat privilege issues involving foreign
patent agents, there is risk and uncertainty in relying solely on In re Queen's to protect
communications with a foreign patent agent.") [https://perma.cc/8TD3-B6FL].
64 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1295.
165 Rule Recognizing Privileged Communications Between Clients and Patent Practi-
tioners and the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 Fed. Reg., at 71657 (stating that patent
agent communications "shall receive the same protections of privilege as if that communica-
tion were between a client and an attorney authorized to practice in the United States").
166 REGULATIONS.GOV, RULE RECOGNIZING PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS BETWEEN




167 See infra Part IV (discussing concerns about the PTO's proposed rule).
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not, such communications should be subject to discovery. As with most mat-
ters of policy, however, answering the question is not nearly as easy as posing
it.
There are important policy justifications for deeming patent agent commu-
nications as privileged. Although the price varies widely depending on the
technology, it is expensive to patent inventions.168 The patent agent privilege
helps defray costs by allowing inventors and others to rely on patent agents,
who generally charge lower fees than attorneys.169 This makes patent protec-
tion more accessible, which seems particularly important in a post-AIA world
where independent inventors and small businesses may already be disadvan-
taged by the transition to a first-to-file system.170 What is more, like its attor-
ney-client counterpart, the patent agent privilege should promote efficiency
and predictability in litigation, and reduce costs associated with discovery dis-
putes.171
Yet, there's a good argument that patent lawyers-as experts in the law-
should be the ones advising and guiding inventors through the complicated pa-
tent process. Whether an invention satisfies the requirements for patentability
is, after all, a legal determination.172 Moreover, the Supreme Court in Sperry
"I See Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the U.S., IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4,
2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-
us/id=56485/ [https://perma.cc/UQ8S-PD37].
169 See, e.g., Ryan Davis, Fed. Cir. Patent Agent Privilege Rule to Lower Legal Costs,
LAw360 (Mar. 9, 2016), https://www.1aw360.com/articles/768772/print?section=appellate
[https://perma.cc/V7KV-QMEL] ("Including patent attorneys on communications with pa-
tent agents just to preserve attorney-client privilege drives up the cost of preparing and pros-
ecuting patent applications."); Stephen Key, Should You Hire a Patent Agent Instead of a
Patent Attorney?, INC., http://www.inc.com/stephen-key/should-you-hire-a-patent-agent-
instead-of-a-patent-attorney.html (last visited April 1, 2017) ("[T]he major advantage of
working with a patent agent is most often price.").
70 See David S. Abrams & R. Polk Wagner, Poisoning the Next Apple? The America
Invents Act and Individual Inventors, 65 STAN. L. REv. 517, 520 (2013) (stating that small
inventors "are likely to be slower in turning an invention into a patent application than larg-
ei corporations"). Congress took certain countermeasures in the AIA to address the concern
of independent inventors and small businesses, including mandating that he PTO (1) estab-
lish a pro bono progranm-see 35 U.S.C. § 41(h) (2011)-and (2) undertake a study on in-
ternational patent protection for small businesses-see Leahy-Smith America Invents Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 31, 125 Stat. 284, 339 (2011).
171 See Upjohn v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 392-93 (1981) (discussing how attorney-
client privilege should promote predictability); AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE
ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, REPORT ON THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE, at 2
(May 18, 2005), http://www.abanet.org/buslaw/attorneyclient/materials/hod/report.pdf
(finding that the attorney-client privilege promotes "the proper and efficient functioning of
the American adversary system of justice").
172 See, e.g., In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (finding patentable
subject matter is a question of law); Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., 520 F.3d 1337,
1343 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ("[The ultimate conclusion of obviousness is a question of law.").
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acknowledged that patent prosecution and related activities constitute the prac-
tice of law.1 73 So, perhaps a rule that encourages the use of attorneys over
agents would be the better way to go.
At the end of the day, however, we are not writing on a blank slate. Patent
agents have played an integral role in the patent system for a very long time,174
and the Federal Circuit has already decided that patent agent communications
are entitled to some protection.175 Still, these policy considerations should play
a key role in delineating the patent agent privilege going forward.
As the Supreme Court has cautioned, "[a]n uncertain privilege, or one which
purports to be certain but results in widely varying applications by the courts,
is little better than no privilege at all."1 76 Not only are there a number of open
questions about the patent agent privilege created by the Federal Circuit,177 but
the PTO has taken steps toward adopting a different rule for administrative
proceedings before the PTAB. 78 At a time when conflicts between rules for
patent litigation in federal court and at the PTAB are already creating signifi-
cant confusion in patent law,179 stakeholders would benefit from a harmonized
approach to privilege for patent agents. The aim of this final Part is to high-
light some of those inconsistencies, so we can begin to consider how best to
shape this nascent legal principle.
A. What Communications Are Protected By the Privilege?
Both the Federal Circuit's and the PTO's privilege rules are addressed to
communications that "are reasonably necessary or incident to" the agent's per-
formance of her authorized duties.'80 Recognizing the fuzziness of this stand-
ard, each entity provided examples of the types of communications that would
and would not fall within the privilege.'81 But as Judge Reyna pointed out in
'7 Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 382-83 (1963).
174 See supra Part 0 (discussing the history of patent agents in the U.S.).
175 In re Queen's Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1295 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
176 Upjohn, 449 U.S. at 393.
177 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1305-07 (Reyna, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
court's newly-created privilege is complicated and uncertain).
178 See supra Part II.0.
179 See, e.g., Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S.Ct. 2131, 2146 (2016) (upholding
the PTAB's use of the broadest reasonable construction standard for claim construction,
even though courts use the ordinary meaning standard); Merck & CIE v. Gnosis S.P.A., 820
F.3d 432, 433 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (holding that Federal Circuit reviews PTAB's findings on
obviousness for substantial evidence even though it reviews the same findings by a district
court for clear error).
'8' In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1301; Rule Recognizing Privileged Communica-
tions Between Clients and Patent Practitioners at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 Fed.
Reg. 71657 (Oct. 18, 2016).
.8. In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1301-02; Rule Recognizing Privileged Communica-
tions Between Clients and Patent Practitioners at the Patent Trial and Appeals Board, 81
Fed. Reg. 71653, 71657 (Oct. 18, 2016).
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his dissent-and as several commentators have informed the PTO-these at-
tempts at clarification arguably create more confusion.182
The majority in Queen 's University said that "communications with a patent
agent who is offering an opinion on the validity of another party's patent in
contemplation of litigation or for the sale or purchase of a patent, or on in-
fringement" would not be protected by the patent agent privilege.183 But the
PTO itself has said that the question "whether a validity opinion involves prac-
tice before the Office depends on the circumstances in which the opinion is
sought and furnished." 84 It is clear, for example, that a validity opinion
sought for a client contemplating reexam is related to a patent agent's author-
ized practice of law before the PTO.' 85 So, shouldn't that communication be
privileged under the Federal Circuit's rule? 86 What about validity opinions
provided in connection with PTAB proceedings, which usually run parallel to
federal court litigation?87 Are those validity opinions privileged because they
are "reasonably necessary and incident to the preparation and prosecution of
patent applications or other proceedings before the Office"?'88 Or would such
validity opinions be subject to discovery because they were sought "in con-
templation of litigation"? 89
The PTO stated in its proposed rule that "communications between clients
and U.S. patent agents relating to patent application matters would be protected
as privileged under the rule, but communications between these parties regard-
ing litigation strategies would not be." 90 The PTO does not define "litigation
strategies," however, which raises a host of questions. Would communications
between patent agents and clients about strategy in PTAB proceedings-which
are "litigation-like"-be privileged or not?'91 Certainly, patent agents are au-
thorized to represent clients in PTAB proceedings, so it would seem that such
182 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1306 (Reyna J. dissenting).
183 Id. at 1301-02.
184 Changes to Representation of Others Before the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, 73 Fed. Reg. 47650, 47670 (Aug. 14, 2008).
18 Id.
186 Id.
187 See, e.g., Paul R. Gugliuzza, (7n)valid Patents, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 285
(2016) ("Parties who seek post-issuance review at the PTO are, as noted, frequently defend-
ants in patent infringement litigation.").
188 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1301.
189 Id. at 1301-02.
190 Rule Recognizing Privileged Communications Between Clients and Patent Practi-
tioners at the Patent Trial and Appeals Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 71653, 71655 (Oct. 18, 2016).
' See, e.g., Samuel Goldstein, Comment in Response to NPRM in PTO-P-2016-0029,
(Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=PTO-P-2016-0029-0008 (sug-
gesting that the PTO specify whether the privilege would protect communications regarding
strategies in instituted IPR proceedings or assessments of the validity of a patent in contem-
plation of an IPR proceeding) [https://perma.cc/X7GS-THZ6].
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conversations should be privileged.192 On the other hand, communications of
this nature are easily characterized as "litigation strategies," especially since
PTAB proceedings are increasingly used by accused infringers as part of a
broader litigation plan.193 Perhaps the analysis would turn on the purpose of
the discussions much like the question surrounding validity opinions.194
Finally, there are ambiguities about the underlying bases for these new
privilege rules that are bound to generate further litigation. Before Queen's
University, lower courts had divided on the question whether patent agent
communications were covered by the attomey-client privilege. 195 Instead of
relying on the attorney-client privilege, however, the Federal Circuit recog-
nized a new patent agent privilege, which it clearly had the power to do under
the Federal Rules of Evidence.196 For some reason, the PTO seems confused
about this. In proposing its privilege rule, the PTO explained that the Federal
Circuit had "recently recognized that attorney-client privilege applies to U.S.
patent agents acting within the scope of their authorized practice," which is
simply not accurate.197 The PTO then proceeded to ground its proposed rule in.
the attorney-client privilege saying that patent agent communications shall re-
ceive the same protections as if they "were between a client and an attorney
authorized to practice in the United States, including all limitations and excep-
tions." 98 This approach is confusing both because it differs from the Federal
Circuit's, and because it suggests that the patent agent privilege is co-extensive
with the attorney-client privilege.'9 9
192 37 C.F.R. § 11.5 (2008).
193 See, e.g., Saurabh Vishnubhakat et al., Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and.
District Court Proceedings, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 48 (2016) ("[T]he rise of the
PTAB forces patent owners to factor in the strong possibility of retaliatory or even preemp-
tive patent validity challenges at the PTAB.").
194 See In re Queen's Univ. at Kingston, 820 F.3d 1287, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Reyna,
J., dissenting) ("[U]nder the Majority's newly-created agent-client privilege, some validity
opinions drafted by an agent will be privileged and others will not be, depending on the cli-
ent's intent in seeking the opinion from the agent. But how do we determine which is
which, and what does such contentious activity say about he demand for truth?").
19 See supra Part II.B.
196 In re Queen's Univ., 820 F.3d at 1302 ("We find, consistent with Rule 501 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence, that a patent-agent privilege is justified 'in the light of reason
and experience.' We therefore recognize a patent-agent privilege. . . .") (citing Jaffee v.
Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 8 (1996)).
' Rule Recognizing Privileged Communications Between Clients and Patent Practi-
tioners at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 71655 (proposed Oct. 18, 2016)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42) (emphasis added).
'" Id. at 71657.
'19 Jeff Liu, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Recognizing Privileged Communica-
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B. Where Does the Privilege Apply?
Privilege rules are generally a product of common law, so their applicability
often depends on a choice of law analysis.200 Since patent infringement actions
are subject to exclusive jurisdiction in federal court,201 Queen s University will
govern patent agent privilege questions in the vast majority of patent cases.
Still, there is a small percentage of patent-related cases that are heard in state
court in which patent agent communications could be the subject of discovery
requests.202 It is not clear in those cases whether the patent agent privilege cre-
ated in Queen's University would apply.
Indeed, not even six months after the Federal Circuit issued its decision in
Queen's University, an appellate court in Texas faced this very question in In
Re Silver.203 The case involves a contract dispute between Andrew Silver and
TableTop Media LLC (TableTop).204 Silver alleges that the parties entered in-
to a patent purchase agreement, and that TableTop owes him royalties.205 Dur-
ing the litigation, TableTop sought production of hundreds of communications
between Silver and his patent agent, which Silver refused to produce on privi-
lege grounds.206 When TableTop moved to compel, the court granted the mo-
tion finding that the communications were not protected.207
Silver sought mandamus review, which the Texas appellate court denied in a
2-1 decision.208 The majority found that Queen's University was not control-
ling because this was a state law contract dispute, not a patent infringement ac-
tion based on federal law.209 Accordingly, the court reasoned, state-not fed-
eral-privilege law applies.2 10 Because Texas does not recognize a patent
agent privilege, and the court declined to create one, the majority upheld the
order granting TableTop's motion to compel.211
Much like Queen's University, there was a long dissent in Silver.212 Rather
than advocate for the Federal Circuit's newly-created patent agent privilege,
the dissent argued that he communications at issue were privileged under Tex-
200 See, e.g., Earl C. Dudley, Jr., Federalism and Federal Rule of Evidence 501: Privi-
lege and Vertical Choice ofLaw, 82 GEO. L.J. 1781, 1832, 1834-35 (1994).
201 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2012).
202 See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 1068 (2013) (holding that federal courts
do not have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over state law claims alleging legal mal-
practice in patent cases).
203 See generally In re Silver, 500 S.W.3d 644, 646 (Tex. App. 2016).
204 Id at 645.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 645-46.
207 Id. at 646.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 646-47.
211 Id. at 647.
212 Id. at 647-52.
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as's attorney-client privilege rules.213 Specifically, Texas Rule of Evidence
503 defines "lawyers" for purposes of privilege as "a person authorized.. .to
practice law in any state or nation."214 Thus, because Sperry held that patent
agents are authorized to practice law before the PTO, which is in this nation,
their communications fall within the attorney-client privilege.215
Silver's appeal is currently pending before the Texas Supreme Court, so
he may still be able to prevent disclosure of the communications with his pa-
tent agent.216 Whatever ultimately happens in Silver, the case provides a prime
example of the type of problem that courts are sure to face in coming years re-
garding the patent agent privilege.
C. Who Is Protected by the Privilege?
A final gray area that will need clarification concerns who will be protected
by the patent agent privilege. While the Federal Circuit's privilege rule is di-
rected at domestic patent agents, the PTO's proposed rule extends to foreign
practitioners as well.2 17 Specifically, the PTO rule covers "[f]oreign patent
practitioner[s]" who are individuals "authorized to provide legal advice on pa-
tent matters in a foreign jurisdiction, provided that the jurisdiction establishes
professional qualifications and the practitioner satisfies them, and regardless of
whether that jurisdiction provides privilege or an equivalent under its laws." 218
The PTO has been applauded for expanding the scope of privilege in this
way given the global nature of patent practice.219 But what will it mean if a
foreign patent agents' communications are protected at the PTO but not in a
U.S. federal court? And what implications might there be if the U.S. protects a
foreign practitioner's communications that wouldn't be protected in her home
country?220 More fundamentally, is there any basis for the PTO to protect the
213 Id. at 647.
214 TEX. R. EvID. 503 (emphasis added).
215 Silver, 500 S.W.3d at 649-50.
216 See generally Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In Re Silver, 2016 WL 4718484 (2016)
(No. 16-0682).
217 Rule Recognizing Privileged Communications Between Clients and Patent Practi-
tioners at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 81 Fed. Reg. 71657 (proposed Oct. 18, 2016)
(to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).
218 Id
219 See, e.g., Federation Internationale Des Conseils En Propriete Intellectuelle (FICPI),
Comment Letter on Proposed Rule Recognizing Privileged Communications Between Cli-
ents and Patent Practitioners at the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (Dec. 19, 2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/document?D=PTO-P-2016-0029-0018
[https://perma.cciUE8G-6852].
220 To date, U.S. federal courts have generally recognized a privilege for foreign patent
agents only when the communications would be protected in the agent's home country. See,
e.g., Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Apotex Corp., 193 F.R.D. 530, 535 (N.D. Ill. 2000)
("[fln essence, the court will recognize the application of the privilege if the foreign nation
extends the privilege to communications with patent agents and, with respect to those com-
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communications of foreign practitioners when Sperry and Queen 's University
only addressed the status of patent agents authorized by Congress to practice
before the Patent Office in this country?
CONCLUSION
The patent litigation landscape has changed markedly over the past few
years with the passage of the AIA. Whereas patent cases used to be adjudicat-
ed exclusively in federal court, a significant portion of patent litigation is now
occurring on two fronts-in district courts and at the PTAB. Oftentimes, dif-
ferent rules govern adjudication in the two forums, which is causing a good
deal of confusion for parties, lawyers, and the courts. Because the patent agent
privilege is a new doctrine, policymakers have the opportunity to avoid further
confusion and, instead, aim for a uniform approach to protecting communica-
tions between patent agents and their clients that appropriately balances com-
peting policy concerns.
munications, the agents are more or less functioning as attorneys."); Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., No. 95 Civ. 8833, 1998 WL 158958, at *1 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 2, 1998) ("[flf a communication with a foreign patent agent involves a foreign patent
application, then as a matter of comity, the law of that foreign country is considered regard-
ing whether the law provides a privilege comparable to the attorney/client privilege.").
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